TOBACCO INDUSTRY INTERFERENCE INDEX

Implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in Asian Countries, 2021
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INTRODUCTION

With over 249 million infections and 5 million deaths reported to date globally, the COVID-19 pandemic is leaving behind an indelible impact. Yet, another crisis has been raging for decades that exacerbates COVID-19’s burden on public health systems.

Fueled by profits, the tobacco industry and its products are already killing over eight million people globally per year, mostly in low- and middle-income countries. Because tobacco smoking is a known risk factor for many respiratory infections and noncommunicable diseases, people with these conditions have a higher risk of severe COVID-19 illness and death.

The impacts of the two pandemics converge in Asia. Countries with the most significant number of COVID-19 cases include India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. These countries, alongside China, Japan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Korea, also represent countries with the largest smoking populations in the world. Five transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) that have dominated the global market for the past decade are also present in the region: China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC), Philip Morris International (PMI), British American Tobacco (BAT), Japan Tobacco International (JTI), and Imperial Tobacco Group (ITG). Korea Tomorrow and Global Corporation (KT&G) is competing for market share with these TTCs and aims to "join the ranks of the global "Big Four" tobacco companies by 2025." Except for CNTC, all have already ventured into electronic smoking devices (ESDs) such as e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products (HTPs).

Nearly all Asian countries are Parties to the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). FCTC Article 5.3 emphasizes vigilance and a need to protect public health from the tobacco industry’s strategies that challenge new and weaken existing tobacco control measures and life-saving policies. However, the Article 5.3 implementation guidelines remain largely underutilized by many governments, with non-health policymaking particularly vulnerable to tobacco industry interference.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted that any gap in the implementation of Article 5.3 and its guidelines would provide the tobacco industry ample opportunities to influence governments to its advantage. Low-resourced countries are particularly vulnerable to the tobacco industry. For example, the industry stepped up its corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities such as donations of medical equipment and hospital supplies, while enjoying privileges such as tax breaks and blocking regulatory measures such as tax increases that would have given governments potential resources for a robust pandemic response.

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1 Refers to South Korea or officially Republic of Korea in this report.
2 Electronic cigarettes or e-cigarettes are the most common types of electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) that also include e-cigars, e-pipes, and e-shisha, that heat a nicotine-containing e-liquid or e-juice without tobacco.
This 3rd Asian Tobacco Industry Interference Index report gauges the level of implementation of Article 5.3 and its guidelines in 19 countries. Mongolia joins the roster of countries in addition to Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Partners in each country conducted the initial survey and prepared a national report based on publicly available evidence from January 2020 to March 2021 (See Annex 1). For consistency, a standard questionnaire and scoring method\textsuperscript{10} are used to identify and quantify the frequency and severity of tobacco industry interference and specific government measures or responses to address these incidents. As the report uses only publicly available data, analysis is limited. Nevertheless, these assessments may still help identify specific policy gaps where governments can make improvements.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

» Despite considerable obstacles in countering the tobacco industry, eleven (11) countries have adopted preventive measures specifically to implement Article 5.3 and other best practices to isolate and de-normalize the tobacco industry interference as part of good governance.

» Japan has the highest level of tobacco industry interference on most indicators, placing it at the bottom among countries in Asia; Brunei and Mongolia are the top countries making progress in the region.

» When the tobacco industry is unhindered in policy development, its influence in tobacco control policies is seen in Indonesia, Philippines, China, and Japan, which scored high in this indicator.

» The tobacco industry thrives in influencing governments to relax tobacco control measures, including regulations on ESDs in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam to be aligned with the industry’s business.

» Tobacco industry-sponsored CSR activities intensified, with initiatives specifically directed at governments’ pandemic-induced emergency responses. Both health and non-health front liners became vulnerable to the industry and received cash donations, protective equipment, and medical/hospital supplies, among others.

» Except in Brunei, where there is no domestic tobacco producer or manufacturer, the tobacco industry continues to receive benefits such as tax breaks, subsidies, or facilitation of trade agreements in the 18 other countries. Bangladesh and the Philippines exempted tobacco products from restrictions on non-essential goods/sectors during the pandemic.

» Unnecessary interactions with the tobacco industry occurred even when most events and physical gatherings were banned because of COVID-19. In 2020, activities related to illicit trade enforcement remained a specific area where governments work side-by-side with the industry. Government awards and recognition that elevate the profile of the tobacco industry were also frequent.

» A systemic lack of transparency in disclosing government interactions with the tobacco industry remains a substantial problem. Almost all countries (except Brunei and Philippines) do not have a procedure to make these interactions public. None of the countries have a registry to disclose the tobacco industry’s affiliate organizations, individuals, or lobbyists acting on its behalf.

» Conflicts of interest persist by accepting political contributions from the tobacco industry, incumbents and/or former government officials working for tobacco companies, and government funds invested in the tobacco business.
**FIGURE 1: TOBACCO INDUSTRY INTERFERENCE IN ASIAN COUNTRIES**

Figure 1 shows the overall level of tobacco industry interference in 19 countries in Asia in 2021. Lower scores mean better implementation of Article 5.3 and its guidelines.

![Diagram showing the ranking of countries based on the level of tobacco industry interference](image)

The lower the score, the better the ranking
TOBACCO INDUSTRY INTERFERENCE IN ASIAN COUNTRIES

INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Brunei, Cambodia, Korea, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Thailand (Figure 2) do not accept policy positions or legislative drafts by or in collaboration with the tobacco industry. In these countries, the tobacco industry has no designated seat in government bodies to participate in public policy formulation.

In many other countries, the tobacco industry and agents acting on its behalf freely participate in policymaking and exert influence to drive industry-friendly policy outcomes. For example, JTI used diplomatic channels to pressure the Bangladesh government over tobacco control measures that it claimed were hurting JTI’s business, and it warned that it would impede the flow of direct investments from Japan. In Myanmar, the industry also regularly submits unsolicited proposals on tobacco tax policy reform and administration, which the government considers to finalize the Union Tax Law.

Similarly, governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines regard the tobacco industry as a legitimate stakeholder and legally permit industry participation in policy development.

State ownership in the tobacco business (Table 1) also allows direct inclusion of the tobacco industry in formulating and implementing public health policies. The Healthy China Action Plan (2019-2030), one of the most important policy frameworks for health in China, includes the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA) to implement public health policies at the national level. In Japan, the Tobacco Business Act guarantees the tobacco industry to self-regulate its products’ promotions and advertising.

Table 1: State-owned tobacco enterprises in Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japan Tobacco Group (JTG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Lao Tobacco Limited (LTL) (joint venture with Imperial Tobacco Group (ITG))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Thailand Authority of Thailand (TAOT), formerly Thai Tobacco Monopoly (TTM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Vietnam National Tobacco Corporation (Vinataba)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No local tobacco producers or manufacturers in Brunei and Maldives. Maldives’ Tobacco Control Board allows representation from the business community and the National Chamber for Commerce but members undergo a vetting process to determine that there is no conflict of interest. Mongolia has no national tobacco board.

* China and Japan have included representatives from the industry to join government delegations at the Conference of Parties (COP), the FCTC’s decision-making body, in previous meetings (2014, 2016, and 2018).
FIGURE 2: INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT

The lower the score, the better the ranking
In 2020, the tobacco industry continued to push for new industry-favorable regulatory measures on ESDs and/or reversal of existing regulations in countries where they are not yet banned. In Indonesia, the industry’s lobbying for special regulation on ESDs gained traction with the Ministry of Industry’s plan to develop a national standard for HTPs in 2020 and e-cigarettes in 2021. Similarly, in Vietnam, following a series of events engaging PMI, the Ministry of Science and Technology issued three sets of standards on HTPs that all benefit the industry. In Malaysia, the government abandoned the health ministry’s recommendation to ban ESDs by applying excise taxes on devices and liquids, thereby legalizing these products. In the Philippines, Congress continued to deliberate on bills aiming to weaken Republic Act No. 11467 that gave the Food and Drug Administration express authority to regulate ESDs, prohibited sales to non-smokers and persons below 21 years old, and limited flavors to plain tobacco or plain menthol. During committee hearings, representatives/front groups of the tobacco industry were invited to state their comments and even propose legislative language, which the House of Representatives incorporated into a bill that not only will allow advertising, promotions, and sponsorships, and vaping indoors through designated vaping areas, but also transfer regulatory authority to the Department of Trade and Industry, remove the prohibition on sale to non-smokers, lower the legal sales age to 18 years, and allow multiple flavors attractive to teens.

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1 General Department of Standards, Metrology and Quality of Vietnam - Ministry of Science and Technology Decision 3458 / QĐ-BKHCN: TCVN 1354 – 2020 (nitrogen oxides content); TCVN 1355 – 2020 (carbon monoxide content); and TCVN 1356 – 2020. (products specification).

2 Philip Morris Fortune Tobacco Corporation (PMFTC), JUUL Labs, Philippine E-Cigarette Industry (PECIA), The Vapers Philippines, JT (Philippines), RELX Technology, Harm Reduction Alliance of the Philippines.
INDUSTRY CSR ACTIVITIES

The tobacco industry needs to divert attention from the diseases and other harms caused by the products it manufactures and sells. To project an image of corporate goodwill, tobacco industry-sponsored CSR activities often target socially or economically vulnerable groups.

But there is nothing responsible about an industry that kills more than half of its customers, pollutes the environment, or treats workers with unlawful labor practices. To this end, Brunei, Lao PDR, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, and Thailand, have banned these activities (Figure 3), while Sri Lanka applies some restrictions.11

Pandemic-specific CSR activities

In several countries, despite prohibitions on tobacco-related CSR, the industry continues to circumvent the bans, especially when government resources are inadequate. At the pandemic’s onset, the industry donated personal protective equipment (PPEs), medical supplies, and food provisions in many areas affected by lockdowns. In Myanmar, the national task force on the pandemic under the Ministry of Health and Sports received a donation from cheroot producers amounting to MMK 35 million (USD 25,000). Surya Nepal, a subsidiary of India Tobacco Company (ITC) and BAT, also donated NPR 10 million (USD 85,000) each to Nepal’s five provincial chief ministers.12 In Thailand, TAOT manufactured and distributed disinfectant sprays to hospital employees and the public.13

In China, where there are no restrictions on tobacco-related CSR, the state-owned CNTC donated RMB 456 million (USD 70 million) for the pandemic response, strengthening the industry’s position as a “pillar of the economy.”14 In India,15 tobacco companies committed USD 37 million in donations to various government funds as part of the industry’s relief activities.16 The industry also reported charitable donations in Korea through KT&G17 and PMI in Pakistan.18

The government of Indonesia19 also expressed appreciation to the tobacco industry for its contributions to pandemic response, which included food packages, PPEs, COVID-19 testing machines, and ambulances.20

The unprecedented pandemic-induced emergency and the shortage of health resources in many countries presented opportunities for the tobacco industry to conduct CSR activities in partnership with medical and non-medical front liners. For example, in Bangladesh, BAT donated PPEs and its sanitizer, Shudhdho,21 to government hospitals, the military, and the police22 while JTI distributed food and hygiene packages in collaboration with Rapid Action Battalion, a unit of the national police. In Malaysia, JTI donated PPEs worth MYR 150,000 to the police force.23

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11 Under the National Authority on Tobacco and Alcohol (NATA), the industry cannot sponsor educational, cultural, social or sporting organization, activity or event. However, publicity that does not use tobacco brand names or trademarks are allowed.
12 The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act (COTPA) bars tobacco CSR activities, but a recent amendment to the Companies Act mandates large companies including tobacco companies spend 2% of their profit for CSR activities.
13 Although, Article 36 of Government Regulation 109/2012 restricts promotions and media coverage of tobacco industry sponsorships, other national laws encourage and promote CSR activities, allowing national and local governments to receive support for such initiatives.
14 Produced by BAT Bangladesh using its manufacturing facilities and distributed under its newly founded Prerona Foundation.
FIGURE 3: INDUSTRY CSR ACTIVITIES

The lower the score, the better the ranking
Non-pandemic related CSR continued

The tobacco industry also continued its non-pandemic CSR activities covering a wide array of projects, which the industry implements directly or in collaboration with other organizations. For example, in Bangladesh, the tobacco industry donates to the Bangladesh Labour Welfare Foundation (BLWF) to support labor welfare projects. In India, ITC engaged local NGOs to initiate livelihood programs for farmers and daily wage earners under the government’s flagship employment program. In the Philippines, Philip Morris Fortune Tobacco Corporation (PMFTC), through its CSR arm, Embrace, partners mainly with Jaime V. Ongpin Foundation and conducted at least 34 of these so-called CSR activities in 2020.

In attempts to whitewash its harmful impacts and practices, the tobacco industry also supported “ecological restoration projects” mainly through tree planting activities in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. At the same time, domestic tobacco companies and TTCs continue to support multiple projects in education and student aid, livelihood, disaster relief, infrastructure, and rehabilitation in China, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

Notwithstanding the charity, the tobacco industry makes no effort to conceal its real business agenda by sponsoring the construction/designation of more smoking spaces in China, branding the campaign as “civilized smoking environment”, as well as in Japan and Korea.

The tobacco industry engages different sectors in its CSR activities to whitewash its business and disassociate its corporate image from the many harms caused by the products it manufactures and sells. Ultimately, it aims to circumvent bans on tobacco advertisements and promotions and gain public acceptance (normalization) and political leverage.”
The tobacco industry’s business portfolio is still highly valued for its perceived contributions to economic growth. Consequently, this earns the industry privileges or incentives from governments to expand its business further. Except for Brunei, the tobacco industry continues to enjoy these benefits from governments across Asia (Figure 4).

**Carving out tobacco industry exemptions**

A serious consequence of the preferential treatment to the industry is political accommodation to influence policies. Pro-industry policies not only impact finance and trade but, more importantly, have adverse effects on public health. To illustrate, most governments have imposed lockdowns limiting movement in the economy to only essential goods and services to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. However, in Bangladesh, BAT and JTI received special permission from the Ministry of Industries (MOI) to continue purchasing tobacco leaf, manufacturing, and distributing finished goods while the country was under a nationwide lockdown. Although the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare requested to withdraw such permission, which connotes tobacco and tobacco products as essential commodities, the MOI turned down the request.

Philippines also classified tobacco as non-essential and restricted its transport and delivery in areas under lockdown in March 2020. By April 2020, the finance department announced that lifting the transport restriction on tax-paid cigarettes is “under consideration because the absence encourages illicit trade.” The government eventually lifted the restrictions and announced that the tobacco industry could fully operate in areas under general community quarantine.

**Governments deferring or postponing tobacco control measures**

Broadly, the tobacco industry benefits from weakened tobacco control measures and extended timelines to implement these measures.

Despite time-bound obligations under the FCTC, China still has no national-level smoke-free policy (Article 8), and health warnings on tobacco product packaging (Article 11) remain text-only.

Japan has not progressed much and still maintains text-only warnings on tobacco product packaging, no penalties for smoking in non-smoking areas, no bans on tobacco advertising and promotions (Article 13), and only increasing tobacco taxes periodically (Article 6). Japan’s Health Promotion Law, revised in 2018, took effect in April 2020, giving a lengthened implementation period of 22 months.

In Korea, there are no policies to restrict displays of tobacco products at points-of-sale and tobacco sponsorships.

In Indonesia, the government announced an average excise hike of 12.5% for tobacco products effective in 2021, but excluded hand-rolled kreteks. By April 2020, the government eased the payment scheme by extending the payment deadline from 60 to 90 days, and the time limit for withdrawing tobacco products with old excise stamps in the market, by 60 days. Eventually, the effective date of the tax increase was also moved from January to February 2021, which allowed the industry to sell at old market prices, deprived the government of additional revenues, and sustained rather than discouraged tobacco use.

In Thailand, the effectivity date of the ineffective two-tier tax rate was also extended for another year, while in India, Korea, Malaysia, and Nepal, there is no tax increase to take effect in 2021.

In Cambodia, the adoption of the Joint Prakas to implement the penalties (fines) under the Tobacco Control Law has not progressed. At the same time, the rotation of the pictorial health warning set in August 2020 was also postponed by a year.

Likewise, the implementation of Sri Lanka’s standardized packaging on tobacco products is also delayed along with the proposed ban on the sale of single stick cigarettes.

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BENEFITS TO THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY

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Likewise, the implementation of Sri Lanka’s standardized packaging on tobacco products is also delayed along with the proposed ban on the sale of single stick cigarettes.
FIGURE 4: BENEFITS TO THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY

The lower the score, the better the ranking

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

BRUNEI VIETNAM SRI LANKA INDIA MALDIVES PAKISTAN THAILAND
CAMBODIA MONGOLIA NEPAL MALAYSIA MYANMAR JAPAN KOREA
LAO PDR PHILIPPINES BANGLADESH CHINA INDONESIA
Tax breaks, incentives, and trade boosts

The tobacco industry also benefitted from tax breaks and exemptions in 2020. For example, ITC was exempted from corporate income tax in India for contributing USD 1.5 billion to the government’s relief fund (PM Cares Fund). As in previous years, Myanmar’s Union Tax Law of 2020 exempts cheroots, cigars, and raw tobacco from tax payments if annual production costs do not exceed MMK 20 million (USD 14,700), and Thailand still applies tax exemptions for native tobacco leaves (up to 1 kilogram) used for non-industrialized purposes.

The 25-year (2001-2026) Investment License Agreement (ILA) between the government and Imperial Tobacco, which created the LTL joint venture, provides excise tax ceilings for LTL products and is a crucial barrier for the government to increase tobacco taxes in Lao PDR.

In Japan, where cigarette tax rates are already low, HTPs are taxed significantly lower. This is the same in the Philippines, where the law amending the internal revenue code increased the excise tax on ESDs but at rates that are still substantially lower than rates imposed on cigarettes, aligning with the tobacco industry’s agenda. Consequently, PMI started the sale of its IQOS HTP in Manila.

The bilateral agreement between Cambodia and Vietnam that grants duty-free exemptions for dried tobacco leaves (up to 3,000 tons per year) imported from Cambodia into Vietnam was still in effect in 2020.

Only Brunei and Sri Lanka do not permit duty-free allowances of tobacco products for international travelers. Table 2 summarizes the quantities allowed in the rest of the countries.

The industry also enjoys continued protection and direct government support for development. In India, the government initiated several agricultural research projects to enhance tobacco productivity. Similar support is also accorded to the state-owned tobacco business in China, Japan, and Vietnam since the government’s share/ownership incentivizes the government to protect the industry’s profits.

In Korea, tobacco producer associations receive subsidies for facilities and equipment from the government, while tobacco-growing provinces in the Philippines also get preferential shares from excise tax revenues.

Table 2: Duty-free allowance for international travelers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Allowance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>100 cigarettes or 25 cigars or 125 grams of tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>200 cigarettes or 50 cigars or 225 grams of tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>200 cigarettes or 50 cigars or 250 grams of chopped tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>200 cigarettes or 25 cigars or 100 grams of rolling tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>200 cigarettes or 50 cigars or 250 grams of e-cigarettes or 250 grams of other tobacco products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>200 cigarettes or 50 cigars or 250 grams of tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>200 cigarettes or 225 grams of other tobacco products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>200 cigarettes or 25 cigars or 250 grams of tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>200 cigarettes or 50 cigars or 500 grams of tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>200 cigarettes or 500 grams of other tobacco products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>200 cigarettes or 20 cigars or 250 grams of shredded tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>200 cigarettes or 50 cigars or 250 grams of shredded tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>250 cigarettes or 50 cigars or 250 grams of tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>400 cigarettes or 100 cigars or 250 grams of smoking tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>400 cigarettes, 100 cigars, 20 packages of HTPs, or 50 grams of other kinds of tobacco or a combination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>400 cigarettes or 50 cigars or 250 grams of pipe tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>400 cigarettes or 50 cigars or 250 grams of pipe tobacco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FORMS OF UNNECESSARY INTERACTION

As defined by Article 5.3 guidelines, unnecessary interactions with the tobacco industry occur when government officials attend social functions sponsored by the industry or when the government enters into a partnership with them. All countries, except Brunei and Mongolia, recorded such interactions in 2020 (Figure 5).

No social distancing with the industry

Not even the pandemic prevented some high-level government officials from interacting unnecessarily with the tobacco industry. For example, while most physical gatherings were restricted, PMI met with the President of Indonesia to discuss investments on HTPs.\textsuperscript{62} and in Cambodia, JTI had a courtesy call with the Minister of Women’s Affairs.\textsuperscript{63} In the Philippines, the Chair of the Philippine Red Cross, also an incumbent senator, met with the LT Group, subsidiary owner of PMFTC, to receive the donation of a biomolecular laboratory.\textsuperscript{64}

National and local events covering different aspects of the tobacco business were also organized by the industry and attended by provincial and high-level state officials in China\textsuperscript{65} and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{66} The US-ASEAN Business Council (US-ABC), which lists PMI as a Board Member,\textsuperscript{67} continues to be a medium for the industry to meet with government officials. In its annual business mission to Thailand to promote corporate portfolios, including PMI, US-ABC held discussions with the Prime Minister and other key officials, such as the Deputy Prime Minister and ministers of public health and finance.\textsuperscript{68} US-ABC also met virtually with Malaysian government officials, including the Minister of Finance and the Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office.\textsuperscript{69}

In Pakistan, two Special Assistants to the Prime Minister, equivalent in rank to Federal Minister, officiated the "Made in Pakistan" export initiative organized by Pakistan Tobacco Company, a subsidiary of BAT. VELO, BAT’s oral nicotine pouch product, was also launched during the event.\textsuperscript{70}

Diagram 1: Unnecessary interactions normalize TI and its products

While seemingly harmless, social events and functions provide a gateway for the tobacco industry to access high-level government officials, establish personal ties, and gain political leverage to lobby for favorable policies beneficial to the industry. By attending these events, government officials give the impression of officially endorsing the tobacco industry’s position, which normalizes the industry and its products.
FIGURE 5: FORMS OF UNNECESSARY INTERACTIONS

The lower the score, the better the ranking

1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-12 13-14 15-16 17-18 19-20
Illicit trade – a recurring point of collaboration

Combating illicit trade remains an area where many governments work side-by-side with the tobacco industry. State-owned tobacco enterprises in China, Japan, and Vietnam are mandated by law to assist the government in this area. In Lao PDR, aside from the ILA agreement, a memorandum of understanding between the tobacco industry and the government allows assistance and incentives for anti-smuggling enforcement. Among the 19 countries, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have ratified the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. Despite India being a party to the Protocol, the state governments, senior officials, and police still join trainings organized by FICCI CASCADE, a lobbying body headed by ITC’s Head of Corporate Affairs.

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In Myanmar, the government coordinates with the Anti-Illlicit Trade Group, which has partnered with Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT), a recipient of PMI-IMPACT’s funding to conduct anti-smuggling projects. In Malaysia, the MOF recently announced the creation of a Multi-Agency Task Force, which will include the National Kenaf and Tobacco Board (with JTi as a member), to strengthen enforcement of anti-illicit trade activities. In Philippines and Sri Lanka, customs officials continue to engage the tobacco industry in their enforcement activities, including seizure and ceremonial destruction of counterfeit products.

Elevating the tobacco industry’s profile through awards

Another unnecessary government interaction that benefits the industry is the granting of awards for its corporate operations and so-called CSR activities (Table 3). Government officials and institutions that provide these awards are perceived as endorsing these companies and help elevate the industry’s profile, making de-normalizing the industry and its harmful products even more challenging.

Table 3: Tobacco companies receive awards from governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award category</th>
<th>Government body</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAT Bangladesh</td>
<td>President's Award for Industrial Development&lt;sup&gt;78&lt;/sup&gt; Ministry of Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highest income tax-paying company&lt;sup&gt;79&lt;/sup&gt; National Board of Revenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Tobacco</td>
<td>Excellent Health Management Corporation White 500 Award&lt;sup&gt;80&lt;/sup&gt; Ministry of Economy, Trade, Industry and Japan Health Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KT&amp;G Korea</td>
<td>Prime Minister Prize&lt;sup&gt;81&lt;/sup&gt; (Family-friendly company) Ministry of Gender Equality and Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presidential Prize&lt;sup&gt;82&lt;/sup&gt; (Contribution to law and order) Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAT Malaysia</td>
<td>Life at Work Award&lt;sup&gt;83&lt;/sup&gt; (Best International Organization and Outstanding Practice) Ministry of Human Resources, in collaboration with the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMPTC Philippines</td>
<td>Stakeholder's Award&lt;sup&gt;84&lt;/sup&gt; (for Embrace Program) Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kapayapaan (Peace) Award&lt;sup&gt;85&lt;/sup&gt; (for Embrace Program)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<sup>1</sup> SOUTHEAST ASIA TOBACCO CONTROL ALLIANCE
TRANSPARENCY

The Article 5.3 guidelines call for government transparency in dealing with the tobacco industry and transparency of the industry’s operations itself. Across Asia, the issue of transparency as a whole-of-government approach remains politically complex even within many open democracies. Nearly all countries (except Brunei and Philippines) do not publicly disclose government interactions with the tobacco industry (Figure 6).

In China, meetings between STMA and other government departments that are part of their administrative functions are openly reported. In Vietnam, while government personnel and high-level officials openly interact with the tobacco industry, the details of these interactions are not accessible to the public.

In all countries, domestic laws require the tobacco industry to register particular aspects of its business operations (corporate structure and entity, production, or trading) to operate legally. However, the bidi and smokeless tobacco sectors in India remain largely unregistered. None of the 19 countries have a policy that compels the tobacco industry to publicly disclose its affiliates, including lawyers, consultants, and lobbyists.

“Transparency and accountability are fundamental to address bureaucratic failures, including corruption. These elements often overlap with the level of freedom of information (FOI) or the right to access information. Most Asian countries have limited or underutilized FOI regimes, which make accessing specific information about and from the government generally difficult.”
FIGURE 6: TRANSPARENCY

The lower the score, the better the ranking

1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

A conflict of interest situation occurs when an individual's or institutional's vested interests raise a question of whether their actions, judgment, and/or decision-making can be unbiased. The Article 5.3 guidelines list payments, gifts and services, monetary or in-kind, and research funding offered by the tobacco industry to government institutions, officials, or employees as potential sources of this situation. Figure 7 shows that conflicts of interest continue to take place in nearly all countries in Asia.

The tobacco industry is masterful at operating away from the public eye and exerting its influence with stealth. One way the tobacco industry does this is through a patronage system – providing monetary contributions in anticipation of political leverage and support. In the Philippines, revisions to the corporations law lifted the prohibition on domestic corporations giving donations for political activity,99 moreover, the Election Code allows individuals, including industry representatives, to contribute to candidates, political parties, and their election campaigns. In Mongolia and Thailand, the tobacco industry can also give donations of this type but within set monetary limits. The other countries do not have an existing policy or law to ban this type of contribution and prevent potential conflicts of interest.xi

Conflict of interest can also happen when government funds are invested in the tobacco industry (in addition to state-owned enterprises), and the government is expected to ensure its investments produce profits (Table 4). In Bangladesh, the President owns 0.64% shares in BAT Bangladesh. In India and Malaysia, some public financial entities such as the social security system or investment corporations are also shareholders in tobacco companies, benefiting from the industry’s market growth at the expense of public health.

Table 4: Public investments in the tobacco business

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public entity</th>
<th>% shares in tobacco companies</th>
<th>Tobacco company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (President and Investment Corporation of Bangladesh)</td>
<td>9.9% combined total shares</td>
<td>BAT Bangladesh90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Indian public sector insurance companies</td>
<td>20.5% combined total shares</td>
<td>India Tobacco Company91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Indian nationalized banks and other banks</td>
<td>0.10% combined total shares</td>
<td>VST Industries Limited92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia Employees Provident Fund</td>
<td>5% total shares</td>
<td>BAT Malaysia93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

90Brunei and Maldives do not have a domestic tobacco manufacturing sector; political campaigns do not take place in China, Lao PDR and Vietnam with their unitary/single party government and political systems.
Another way the industry influences public policy is through a revolving door where politicians or civil servants take up tobacco industry jobs in the area of their former public service or where tobacco industry professionals accept government positions that regulate the industry they were once a part of. For example, in Japan, the practice of "amakudari," where former civil servants get comfortable, well-paid jobs in fields related to their ministries, allows officials from the finance ministry to move freely and reach top leadership positions in the tobacco industry.

There is growing evidence that revolving doors are becoming common, undermining trust in governments because of the potential for real or perceived conflicts of interests regarding matters of the state. In 2020, government officials from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Japan, Korea, Myanmar, and Nepal joined the tobacco industry upon retirement. Government officials who joined the industry in previous years are still connected in the same capacities, with new evidence from India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Philippines. Senior government officials in Vietnam who are seconded in Vinataba were even promoted (Table 5).
### Table 5: Revolving doors in Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Retired government officials who joined the tobacco industry</th>
<th>Incumbent government officials holding positions in the tobacco business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Bangladesh | Secretary, Ministry of Industries  
Director, BAT Bangladesh | Managing Director, Investment Corporation of Bangladesh  
Non-executive Director BAT Bangladesh  
Secretary, Ministry of Industries  
Additional Secretary  
Non-executive Directors, BAT Bangladesh  
Director, Central Bank of Bangladesh  
Independent Director, BAT Bangladesh |
| Cambodia | | Senator  
Chairperson, Anco Group of Companies  
President of LYP group (distributor of cigarettes) |
| China | Ambassador to the US and Sri Lanka  
Independent Director, India Tobacco Company  
Ambassador to the US and Germany  
Independent Director, India Tobacco Company  
Several senior government officials  
Board Members, India Tobacco Company | STMA = CNTC |
| India | Director-General for Customs and Excise, Ministry of Finance  
Deputy Executive Chair, National Board for Technology, Information, and Telecommunications  
Supervisory Board, Sampoerna Foundation | Minister of Finance  
Principal shareholder (37.6%) of JT  
Officials under Financial Bureau  
Represent JT |
| Indonesia | Busan Chief Prosecutor  
Auditor and Non-executive Director, KT&G | |

102  
103  
104  
105  
106  
107  
108  
109  
110  
111
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Retired government officials who joined the tobacco industry</th>
<th>Incumbent government officials holding positions in the tobacco business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Vice Minister of Industry and Commerce</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industry and Commerce officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Minister of Industry and Commerce</td>
<td>Members of Tobacco Industry Joint Venture Board of Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair of Lao Tobacco Ltd. Board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Secretary-General of Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair of BAT Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Official, International Organizations and Economic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External Affairs Manager, BAT Myanmar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gorkha Tobacco Company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Director and Chairman of Audit Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair, Pakistan Tobacco Company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Director-General Social Sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Director-General of Customs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ambassador to Mexico</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(with the rank of Lt. General in the Armed Forces)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent Directors, Pakistan Tobacco Company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Undersecretary, Department of Finance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent Director, LT Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supreme Court Chief Justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Bank Governor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Board of Trustees, Tan Yan Kee Foundation Inc.,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the CSR arm of LT Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Royal Thai Police General</td>
<td>CEO of TOAT is considered a government official.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tobacco Authority of Thailand Board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Ministry of Industry and Trade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Director, Vinataba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Director, Ministry of Industry and Trade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Secretary, Vinataba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Appointment for confirmation.*
PREVENTIVE MEASURES

The Article 5.3. guidelines provide recommendations to protect against interference by the tobacco industry and entities working on its behalf. To do this, governments need information about the industry’s activities and practices to ensure the industry operates in a transparent and accountable manner. In addition, a code of conduct for the bureaucracy that prescribes a set of standards for their interactions with the tobacco industry and its representatives is required. Figure 8 shows there is still significant room to improve actions by Asian governments.

Procedure for disclosing records of interaction with the tobacco industry

Brunei, China, India (national and state levels), Maldives, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand have policies for disclosing records of interactions with the tobacco industry and its representatives, while a draft is underway in Nepal. Despite these policies, many governments do not disclose or make information from these interactions accessible to the public.

Code of conduct for interaction with the tobacco industry

Brunei, Philippines, and Thailand have existing policies applicable to all government officials and employees, prohibiting unnecessary interactions with the tobacco industry or its representatives, requiring transparency in any necessary (regulatory) interaction with the tobacco industry, and rejecting partnerships with and financial support from the tobacco industry. In August 2020, Myanmar’s Ministry of Public Health and Sports issued guidelines requiring a code of conduct that prohibits government staff and officials from meeting with the tobacco representative without written permission from the Permanent Secretary.

In July 2020, India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare adopted a code of conduct restricting the collaboration of health ministry officials and staff with the tobacco industry. In Indonesia and Lao PDR, the health ministries also have a code that applies within the respective MOH jurisdictions. Being limited in scope, other ministries that are friendly to and have close ties with the industry in Indonesia, or those involved under the ILA in Lao PDR, continue to foster such relationships without restrictions.

Codes of conduct in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are at different stages of development and approval.

Periodic submission of tobacco industry information

All countries require the tobacco industry, as with all other legitimate industries, to register certain aspects of its business (structure, production, revenues) to operate. Except for Pakistan, none have yet required the tobacco industry to provide information on lobbying, philanthropy, and political contributions.

Systematic program to raise awareness on Article 5.3

Brunei, Cambodia, India, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand have some platforms to raise awareness on Article 5.3. However, these programs are primarily confined within the ministries of health and/or spearheaded by civil society partners. These programs are not yet institutionalized, infrequently conducted, and often have limited resources.

An awareness-raising program or communication plan on Article 5.3 does not exist in Bangladesh, China, Japan, Korea, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam. As a non-Party, Indonesia does not have a program on Article 5.3 and, more broadly, the FCTC.
Policy to prevent contributions from the tobacco industry

All countries have an anti-corruption legal framework, which can include clauses on acceptance of all forms of contributions from the tobacco industry, monetary or otherwise. Many countries also have ethical codes of conduct for government employees and officials that governments can update specifically to include measures to prevent conflicts of interest with the tobacco industry, unnecessary interactions between the industry and government employees, and the receipt of money or gifts from the tobacco industry. 131 Eleven countries in Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam) have put in place policy measures to protect the bureaucracy from tobacco industry interference (Table 6).

Mongolia’s Tobacco Control Law is explicit in forbidding tobacco industry gift-giving to any government entity. 132 In Cambodia, the Ministry of Youth and Sports issued a circular to introduce tobacco-free policies in educational facilities and banned any sponsorship or collaboration with the tobacco industry. 133

In 2020, Philippines’ Department of Health issued several memos and guidelines emphasizing the need for public health policies and endeavors to be free from tobacco industry interference, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic when partnerships and donations are pouring in from all sectors. These also reiterate the CSC-DOH Joint Memorandum Circular’s particular provisions on unnecessary interactions, receiving donations or gifts, and endorsing industry-sponsored CSR activities.

Article 5.3 is an obligation of the whole of government and not just of ministries of health, and addressing tobacco industry interference in the whole of government is essential for stepping up tobacco control efforts to protect public health. An industry that kills more than eight million people a year is not a stakeholder in public health.”

- SEATCA statement at the Ninth Session of the Conference of Parties to the WHO FCTC (COP9)
FIGURE 8: PREVENTIVE MEASURES

The lower the score, the better the ranking

1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 13-15 16-18 19-21 22-24 25-27 28-30
### Preventive measures for tobacco control in Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Preventive measures limited to issuing authority / jurisdictions</th>
<th>Preventive measures that apply to the whole bureaucracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Prime Minister Circular (code of conduct) – Prohibition of involvement of the tobacco industry and smoking in government premises</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports ordinance banning CSR activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Code of Conduct for Public Officials in Compliance to Article 5.3 of WHO FCTC</td>
<td>Article 5.3 State Notifications (sub-national level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Code of Conduct (State of Bihar and Jharkhand)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Ministry of Health Guidelines for Managing Conflicts of Interest with the Tobacco Industry within the Health Ministry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Ministry of Health Tobacco Control Code of Conduct between Government Health Sector and Tobacco Industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Tobacco Control Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Sports Directive No. 91/2020: Directive to Comply with Guidelines on Contact with Cigar and Tobacco Product Manufacturer, Distributor, Seller, or Related Person</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>National Action Plan on Tobacco Industry Interference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Department of Health (DOH) Memo No. 2020-0156 - reiterates JMC and reminds that no donations or assistance from the tobacco industry must be accepted;</td>
<td>Civil Service Commission-Department of Health Joint Memorandum Circular (JMC) 2010-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DOH Admin Order 2021-0022 Guidelines on the Facilitation and Management of Donations to the Health Sector During the Covid-19 Pandemic;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Education (Order No. 6, (2012) Guidelines against tobacco industry interference;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Labor and Employment Memo (2012) - reiterates the JMC;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureau of Internal Revenue Memo No. 16 (2012) - restricts interactions with the tobacco industry;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs Memo (24 May 2013) - directs compliance with the JMC;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metro Manila Development Authority Memo (2013) – amends the Code of Conduct to include protection against tobacco industry interference;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare and Administrative Order No. 11-2019 - guidelines against tobacco industry interference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food and Drug Administration Advisory No. 2019-501 - reminds public physicians to follow the JMC and avoid interaction with the tobacco and e-cigarette industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health Guidelines on Interaction with Tobacco Entrepreneurs and Related Persons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Office of Civil Service Commission Regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Health Official Letter to other ministries on noncooperation with Smoke-free World Foundation funded by PMI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In comparison with their 2020 scores, five (5) countries marginally improved, four (4) remained unchanged, while nine (9) countries showed deterioration in their 2021 rankings (Figure 9). Two factors are likely to have influenced these outcomes: (1) the tobacco industry’s unrelenting and more aggressive tactics, taking advantage of government vulnerability during the COVID-19 pandemic, and (2) increasing public awareness and civil society’s capacity to monitor and de-normalize the industry’s activities.

A whole-of-government approach is fundamental to counter tobacco industry interference effectively. Both health and non-health ministries and sectors remain largely vulnerable to tobacco industry interference, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. All governments must strengthen their efforts to implement Article 5.3, as it is pivotal to successful tobacco control and improved health outcomes.

FIGURE 9: PROGRESS IN COUNTERING TOBACCO INDUSTRY INTERFERENCE

Improved  Deteriorated
Recommendations in the WHO FCTC Article 5.3 guidelines provide clear measures that governments can implement to protect themselves from industry interference and corruption.

» Article 5.3 recognizes the irreconcilable conflict between tobacco industry interests and public health policy. Governments must exclude the tobacco industry as a stakeholder at any level or stage of public policy development.

» The tobacco industry uses CSR activities and other public relations strategies to whitewash and normalize its business and gain public approval and favors from policymakers. Tobacco-sponsored CSR activities are fake CSR, and governments must ban these in all circumstances.

» Waiver of duties for trade facilitation and earmarking development subsidies and incentives for the tobacco industry are prejudicial to public and fiscal health. These divert government resources for services, such as health emergency responses, to an industry that causes socio-economic ills. Governments must revoke preferential treatment to the tobacco industry. More importantly, the industry should be held accountable for non-compliance with tobacco control measures.

» Government interactions with the tobacco industry should occur only when and to the extent strictly necessary to regulate the industry and its products. Governments must reject any partnership with the tobacco industry, including combating the problem of illicit tobacco trade.

» Government transparency and accountability remain a systemic challenge. These institutional issues are linked with weak bureaucratic frameworks, poor governance, and corruption. Governments must establish and enforce government-wide procedures to record and disclose interactions with and information about the tobacco industry.

» Government investments in the tobacco industry are common in Asia. These create actual and potential conflicts of interests in the adoption of tobacco control measures. Governments must divest from the tobacco industry and treat state-owned tobacco enterprises the same as private tobacco businesses.

» Governments need to update existing legal frameworks and strictly enforce a code of conduct compliant with Article 5.3 guidelines and principles of anti-corruption. Codes of conduct should be supported with a systematic Article 5.3 awareness-raising program to guide and protect all public sector professionals from undue industry influence and interference.
### Annex 1: Tobacco Industry Interference in Asian Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
<th>BGD</th>
<th>BRN</th>
<th>KHM</th>
<th>CHN</th>
<th>IND</th>
<th>IDN</th>
<th>JPN</th>
<th>KOR</th>
<th>LAO</th>
<th>MYS</th>
<th>MDV</th>
<th>MNG</th>
<th>MMR</th>
<th>NPL</th>
<th>PAK</th>
<th>PHL</th>
<th>LKA</th>
<th>THA</th>
<th>VNM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of participation in policy development</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government accepts, supports or endorses offer for assistance by or in collaboration with the tobacco industry in implementing tobacco control policies (Rec 3.1)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government accepts, supports or endorses legislation drafted by/ collaboration with the tobacco industry (Rec 3.4)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government allows the tobacco industry to sit in multi-sectoral committee/ advisory group that sets public health policy (Rec 4.8)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government allows representatives from the tobacco industry (including State-owned) in the delegation to the COP or subsidiary bodies or accepts their sponsorship for delegates. (Rec 4.9 &amp; 8.3)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>The government receives contributions from the tobacco industry (including so-called CSR contributions) (Rec 6.4)</td>
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<td>The government agencies/officials endorses, forms partnerships with/ participates in tobacco industry CSR activities (Rec 6.2)</td>
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<td><strong>Benefits to the tobacco industry</strong></td>
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<td>The government accommodates requests from the industry for longer implementation time or postponement of tobacco control law (Rec 7.1)</td>
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<td>Top-level government officials meet with/ foster relations with the tobacco companies such as attending social functions and events sponsored or organized by the tobacco companies (Rec 2.1)</td>
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<td>The government accepts, supports, endorses, or enters into partnerships or agreements with the tobacco industry (Rec 3.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The government does not publicly disclose meetings/interactions with the tobacco industry where such interactions are strictly necessary for regulation (Rec 2.2)</td>
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<td>The government requires rules for the disclosure or registration of tobacco industry entities, affiliate organizations, and individuals acting on their behalf including lobbyists.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The government does not have a policy (whether or not written) to prohibit contributions from the tobacco industry or any entity working to further its interests to political parties, candidates, or campaigns or to require full disclosure of such contributions (Rec 4.11)</td>
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<td>Retired senior officials work for the tobacco industry (Rec 4.4)</td>
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<td>Current government officials and their relatives hold positions in the tobacco business including consultancy positions (Rec 4.5, 4.8 &amp; 4.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The government has a procedure for disclosing records of the interaction with tobacco industry and its representatives (Rec 5.1)</td>
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<td>The government has formulated, adopted or implemented a code of conduct for public officials, prescribing the standards they should comply when dealings with the tobacco industry (Rec 4.2)</td>
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<td>The government requires the tobacco industry to periodically submit information on tobacco production, manufacture, market share, marketing expenditures, revenues and any other activity, including lobbying, philanthropy, and political contributions (Rec 5.2)</td>
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<td>The government has a program/system/plan to consistently raise awareness within its departments on policies relating to FCTC Article 5.3 Guidelines (Rec 1.1, 1.2)</td>
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<td>The government has a policy prohibiting the acceptance of all forms of contributions from the tobacco industry (monetary or otherwise) including offers of assistance, policy drafts, or study visit invitations to the government, officials and their relatives (Rec 3.4)</td>
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REFERENCES

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www.seatca.org
www.tobaccowatch.seatca.org